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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent years have witnessed an extraordinary expansion of the First 
Amendment. In a number of critical areas, the Roberts Court has significantly 
elevated the level of protection for speech, virtually abandoning the concept 
of low-value speech1 and displaying increasing suspicions of content-based 
speech regulation.2 In addition, the Court has been decidedly skeptical of 
campaign finance regulation.3 Not surprisingly, legislative choices once 
understood to be well within the bounds of democratic decision-making are 
these days frequently challenged as violating individual speech rights.  
The superficial appeal of the libertarian First Amendment will eventually 
wear thin with its own success. As breaches into core legislative domains from 
price regulation and minimum wage to food and drug safety become more 
frequent and salient, courts will find it harder and harder to sustain the current 
                                                                                                                     
 * Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University, Thomas R. Kline School of Law. In 
addition to the participants of this Symposium, I wish to extend particular thanks to Jane 
Bambauer, Vincent Blasi, Chapin Cimino, David S. Cohen, Caroline Mala Corbin, Deborah 
Hellman, Genevieve Lakier, Ashley Messenger, Amanda Shanor, Dan Tokaji, and the 
participants at the fifth annual Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference at Yale Law 
School for their generous and provocative comments. 
 1 See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 791 (2011); United States 
v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010). 
 2 E.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226–28 (2015); Brown, 564 U.S. at 
799. 
 3 E.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1458 (2014); Citizens United v. FEC, 
558 U.S. 310, 340–41, 371 (2010). 
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course.4 Yet, the libertarian First Amendment has undeniable appeal.5 By 
offering deceptively bright lines and speciously principled coherence, it 
promises a path out of the maze that First Amendment doctrine has become, 
and judges are likely to struggle to detach themselves from it. 
What is needed, therefore, is a compelling alternative theoretical mooring 
from which to analyze contemporary First Amendment controversies. This 
Article sets forth a prima facie case that this requires committing to a nuanced 
articulation of the self-governance interest.6 In doing so, it makes two central 
claims about the process of resisting the superficial appeal of the libertarian 
conception of the First Amendment. First, it argues that disputes at the cutting 
edge of First Amendment litigation would be significantly clarified if recast 
in the register of separation of powers.7 It is no accident that the Roberts Court 
has been accused of reviving Lochnerism under cover of the First 
Amendment.8 The real threat of the new doctrine is to our democracy. 
Second, and more controversially, it argues that cabining the libertarian 
First Amendment requires abandoning First Amendment pluralism.9 While no 
one seriously denies that an interest in furthering democracy is, and ought to 
be, a primary driver of First Amendment jurisprudence, many worry that the 
self-governance interest provides too narrow a conception of the freedom of 
speech.10 As a result, scholars of the First Amendment, especially since the 
1960s, have proclaimed that a plurality of co-equal interests underlie the 
constitutional protection for freedom of speech, and the doctrine has 
                                                                                                                     
 4 Ashutosh Bhagwat, When Speech is Not “Speech,” 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 839, 842 (2017). 
 5 The number of liberal Justices that can be found on record in favor of an ever-
expansive vision of the First Amendment provides a cautionary tale in this regard. See, e.g., 
Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017) (decided eight-to-zero 
with Justices Ginsburg and Kagan joining the majority); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 
552 (2011) (decided six-to-three with Justice Sotomayor in the majority); Brown, 564 U.S. 
at 787 (decided seven-to-two with Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan in the 
majority); Stevens, 559 U.S. at 463 (decided eight-to-one with Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, 
Sotomayor, and Stevens in the majority). 
 6 For other scholarship calling for further development and commitment to the First 
Amendment’s self-governance theory, see Bhagwat, supra note 4, at 884, and Ashutosh 
Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1097 (2016) (arguing that 
First Amendment theorizing must begin to account for the other textual provisions, each of 
which advances self-governance and an active vision of republican citizenship).  
 7 See infra Part III.A. 
 8 See, e.g., Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 585 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 9 See infra Part II.C.  
 10 See, e.g., 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH (West) 
§ 2:6 (Apr. 2015) (“The democratic self-governance theory is not controversial in 
its minimal sense—no one disputes that freedom of speech is essential to democracy. The 
theory is, however, controversial in its maximum sense: If the theory is advanced as 
the only justification for freedom of speech, it tends to result in doctrines that do not protect 
speech that appears to have little or nothing to do with politics and self-governance, or speech 
that appears antithetical to the basic constitutional order.”). 
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developed in these terms. Throughout, the assumption has been that there is 
no cost to this theoretical pluralism. The Roberts Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence lays bare why this is a mistake, and therefore why it is critical 
to return the focus of First Amendment theorizing to the self-governance 
rationale.  
II. LIBERTY AND THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
When Patrick Henry declared “but as for me, give me Liberty or give me 
death!,” the primary liberty he and his fellow revolutionaries sought was the 
liberty to set the terms of governance with his fellow men.11 The constraints 
subsequently placed by the First Amendment on government control over the 
press, individual and collective speech, political action in the form of 
assemblies, associations and petitioning for redress of grievances, and 
personal faith can only be understood in light of this ultimate purpose. These 
freedoms from were selected for special protection only because they were 
understood to secure a foundation for the freedom to govern.12  
The First Amendment, in other words, secures a set of conditions (freedom 
of speech, press, association, and public assembly) that are necessary to 
government responsiveness and accountability. While in many respects this is 
simply a restatement of the obvious, it turns out, as with much that is obvious, 
a lot more follows than is typically thought. For one, it suggests that a sensible 
First Amendment doctrine is one that both affords strong protections within 
its domain and delimits the sphere of robust First Amendment rights. In 
particular, the free speech rights of individuals cannot be so extensive as to 
undermine the end for which they were established, what we now call 
democratic politics. For another, it follows that individuals’ free speech rights 
cannot be so great as to undermine, either directly or indirectly, the co-equal 
rights secured by the text of the First Amendment. That is, individuals’ free 
speech rights cannot be so great as to undermine the capacity for collective 
political action through means other than discourse. 
                                                                                                                     
 11 Patrick Henry, Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death, Declaration at the Virginia 
Convention (Mar. 23, 1775) (transcription available at The Avalon Project, Yale Law 
School), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/Patrick.asp [https://perma.cc/4F5F-9JLP]. 
I wish to thank Jane Mansbridge for this reminder at a conference I recently attended as well 
as Vincent Blasi for sharing the story of Patrick Henry’s influence on Virginia politics and 
how it led to James Madison’s agreement to introduce the First Amendment as a 
congressman. 
 12 Cf. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION 33 (2005) (describing the Framers’ commitment to create a Constitution 
capable of “furthering active liberty, . . . a form of government in which all citizens share the 
government’s authority, [and] participat[e] in the creation of public policy”). 
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A. “Live Free or Die”–Revisiting the Meaning of Liberty 
The First Amendment cordons off certain spaces from government 
intervention not as an end in itself, but in order to preserve the possibility of 
the republican form of government created by the Constitution. While the Bill 
of Rights guarantees a range of individual freedoms, it is critical to view them 
in context.  
The Revolution had been fought primarily for “the positive liberty of self-
government.”13 This was the liberty to which Patrick Henry referred, and the 
concept Major General John Stark invoked, when he asked his fellow veterans 
of the Revolutionary War to remember those who had died with the toast “Live 
Free or Die.”14 Major General Stark was acknowledging by his toast that those 
who initially petitioned the British Parliament for redress, and ultimately 
fought for independence, did so to secure a voice in their government. The 
modern libertarian appropriation of that phrase is, thus, a revisionist 
misappropriation.15 Parliament’s alleged breach of the customary constitution 
was not the act of taxation as such. It was the imposition of taxes on British 
citizens by fiat.16 The revolutionary call was “No Taxation Without 
Representation” for a reason. 
Our tendency to speak as if the central dilemma of constitutional law is 
how to balance the tension between democracy and individual rights, 
especially First Amendment Rights, is unfortunate. It inaccurately implies a 
                                                                                                                     
 13 See Deborah Hellman, Essay, Resurrecting the Neglected Liberty of Self-
Government, 164 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 233, 233 (2016) (noting that “[t]he liberty of citizens 
in a democracy has two components—the negative liberty to be let alone and the positive 
liberty of self-government”). 
 14 Major General John Stark is said to have written the toast for the thirty-second 
anniversary reunion of the 1777 Battle of Bennington in Vermont, which he could not attend 
due to poor health. Letter from Major General John Stark to Comm. at Bennington (July 31, 
1809), in HOWARD PARKER MOORE, A LIFE OF GENERAL JOHN STARK OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 
499, 499–500 (1949); see also State v. Hoskin, 295 A.2d 454, 455 (N.H. 1972) (noting toast 
in full as “Live free or die; death is not the worst of evils”).  
 15 See, e.g., Bob Burg, Persuasion for the Cause of Liberty, MO. LIBERTARIAN PARTY 
 (Feb. 2003), https://lpmo.org/news/Give-Me-Liberty [https://perma.cc/P6G3-ZJ8R] (equating  
liberty with freedom from government intervention).  
 16 Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms (July 6, 1775), in 1 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1760–1776, at 213, 214–15 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1950) 
(“They have undertaken to give and grant our Money without our Consent, though we have 
ever exercised an exclusive Right to dispose of our own Property; . . . But why should we 
enumerate our Injuries in detail? By one Statute it is declared, that Parliament can ‘of right 
make Laws to bind us in all Cases whatsoever.’ What is to defend us against so enormous, 
so unlimited a Power? Not a single Man of those who assume it, is chosen by us; or is subject 
to our Controul or Influence . . . .” (second emphasis added)). 
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zero-sum game between the First Amendment’s negative rights and the larger 
republican project.17  
The First Amendment’s negative liberties are not at odds with self-
governance; they are its foundation. Its negative liberties are granted in the 
service of ensuring that the political process by which those legislative 
judgments are made is an open one.18 The First Amendment cordons off 
certain spaces for individual and collective liberty in order to preserve the 
possibility that democratic majorities will be able to hold elected bodies 
accountable to the public interest.19 Put differently, it establishes certain 
freedoms in order to maintain a distinction between civil society and 
government—to provide a space for “We the People.”  
It follows, therefore, that the First Amendment rights of individuals cannot 
be so extensive as to undermine the capacity of legislatures to serve their most 
basic function—reaching provisional decisions, after deliberation, on 
contested values.20 This is not a matter of balancing competing constitutional 
principles, but of acknowledging that the end for which a right is established 
must define its limits.  
Important consequences for the scope of First Amendment rights follow. 
Preserving the capacity of legislatures to serve their most basic constitutional 
function requires a presumption of constitutionality with respect to domains 
                                                                                                                     
 17 See Hellman, supra note 13, at 233 (2016) (arguing that democracy can only function 
properly when both types of liberties are given their appropriate weight). 
 18 See Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Essay, Wholly Native to the First Amendment: The Positive 
Liberty of Self-Government, 164 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 241, 242 (2016) (arguing that the 
First Amendment preserves the conditions necessary for the positive liberty described by 
Professor Hellman); Bhagwat, supra note 6, at 1100–11 (describing how each of the 
“democratic rights” of the First Amendment, embodied in the Speech, Press, Assembly, and 
Petition Clauses, furthers self-governance). See generally BURT NEUBORNE, MADISON’S 
MUSIC (2015) (making a similar argument about the Bill of Rights as a whole). 
 19 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1467 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the constitutional commitment to a functioning republic is “rooted . . . in the First 
Amendment itself” and as such “the First Amendment advances not only the individual’s 
right to engage in political speech, but also the public’s interest in preserving a democratic 
order in which collective speech matters”); see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational 
Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 981 (2011) (“[E]nsuring self-governance is the primary 
structural purpose of the First Amendment . . . .”); Robert Post, Participatory Democracy 
and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 482 (2011) (“[T]he best possible explanation of the 
shape of First Amendment doctrine is the value of democratic self-governance.”). 
 20 This focus on legislatures is not meant to preclude the possibility of extending these 
insights to the actions of executive officers or other instantiations of popular sovereignty, 
such as juries. The First Amendment’s constraints on the actions of executive officials and 
juries must, however, be understood in light of its role in securing the legislative function. 
See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.”). 
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that are quintessentially the prerogative of the legislature,21 regardless of 
whether the regulatory choices impact speech, assembly, or association.  
Even without fully resolving the question of what constitutes a 
quintessential legislative domain (a topic to which we will return below), it 
should be obvious that this approach has clear doctrinal implications for 
commercial speech doctrine.22 The ability of representative bodies “to set the 
rules for the economy and establish its boundaries” is central to any account 
of the positive liberty dedicated to the legislative sphere.23 Should workers be 
able to sell their labor for less than a living wage? Should drug manufacturers 
have to disclose to consumers the ingredients in their products and all known 
side effects? Should it be legal to pay for sex or for a surrogate mother to sell 
the baby (not simply to be reimbursed for the inconvenience of the work)? It 
is precisely because such decisions are highly contested that they must be 
resolved through politics, and the legislature must be the final arbiter.  
The central misstep of a libertarian First Amendment is its assumption that 
the protection of individual freedom of speech is an end in itself.24 The 
resulting misreading of the First Amendment, in which limitless free speech 
rights are substituted for the constitutional rights actually granted, warps the 
meaning of the First Amendment in the same way that the State of New 
Hampshire has warped the meaning of John Stark’s toast, “Live Free or Die.”25 
The Founders may have had a preference for a smaller, less interventionist 
government. They may have envisioned a world of “buyer beware” 
contracting in which charlatans were free to hawk their ineffective, harmful 
drugs at will, but what they constitutionalized was a system of responsive 
government, not their particular vision of the proper role of government in the 
market.  
None of the above should be taken as a call for weak First Amendment 
rights. Freedom from government interference with legislative inputs—
broadly conceived to include not only public debate, free association, 
peaceable assembly, and the press, but also cultural practices that facilitate the 
development of autonomous individuals—is necessary for the legislative 
                                                                                                                     
 21 See Hellman, supra note 13, at 235 (arguing that “when the polity, through its 
representatives, makes decisions that implicate the liberty of self-government most strongly, 
those decisions deserve extra deference”). 
 22 See infra Part III.A. 
 23 Hellman, supra note 13, at 233 (arguing that “meaningful self-government requires 
that elected officials be able both to set the rules for the economy and establish its 
boundaries”). 
 24 See Steven J. Heyman, The Conservative-Libertarian Turn in First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 231 (2014); Morgan N. Weiland, Expanding the 
Periphery and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant Libertarian Speech Tradition, 69 STAN. 
L. REV. 1389 (2017). 
 25 See generally State v. Hoskin, 295 A.2d 454, 455–57 (N.H. 1972) (upholding a state 
law requiring drivers to display the state motto, “Live Free or Die,” on their license plates 
and preventing citizens from covering or otherwise obscuring the motto). 
2017] LIBERTY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 923 
outputs of the democratic process to be responsive and for legislatures to be 
kept in check. Within this domain, a strong presumption against legislative 
intrusion is warranted. In fact, there is every reason to worry that in a range of 
areas squarely pertinent to political inputs, and especially in the context of 
public assembly, protection is currently too weak to vindicate the 
Amendment’s constitutional function—protecting a meaningful space from 
which citizens can influence and check government.26 Instead, the framework 
being offered is a call to reprioritize where strong First Amendment rights 
should be granted.27 
B. Freedom of Speech–Co-Equal Rights 
The freedom of speech, however, is neither the only nor the primary 
condition necessary for self-governance protected by the First Amendment.28 
The Supreme Court’s oversight in this regard long precedes the Roberts Court 
and has been reinforced by the fact that, until very recently, the self-
governance interest has been theorized entirely as a theory of the freedom of 
speech.29 The result has been unfortunate in two respects for the case law: 
first, it has led to an overemphasis on discourse and an open marketplace of 
ideas in the quest for self-governance; second, and relatedly, it has led to an 
under-appreciation of the distinct, equally necessary prerequisites to self-
governance protected by the First Amendment—most importantly, those 
associated with collective political participation.30 
The First Amendment itself is not similarly blinded by the value of 
freedom of speech.31 The Founders understood that self-governance would 
                                                                                                                     
 26 See Tabatha Abu El-Haj, All Assemble: Order and Disorder in Law, Politics and 
Culture, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 949, 952–54 (2014) [hereinafter Abu El-Haj, All Assemble]; 
Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly, 56 UCLA L. REV. 543, 553 (2009) 
[hereinafter Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly]. 
 27 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 415 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) 
(“If all expressive activity must be accorded the same protection, that protection will be 
scant. The simple reality is that the Court will never provide child pornography or cigarette 
advertising the level of protection customarily granted political speech.”). See generally 
Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 
449 (1985). 
 28 See Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Friends, Associates, and Associations: Theoretically and 
Empirically Grounding the Freedom of Association, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 65 (2014) 
(demonstrating a First Amendment interest in democratic participation as a second 
necessary, if not sufficient, condition of self-governance, one that the right of association, 
properly conceptualized, is well suited to protect). 
 29 Id. at 61 (maintaining that contemporary “scholars who have argued that the 
Amendment protects participatory democracy . . . theorize participation as the right of 
citizens to share views and shape public discourse”). 
 30 Id. at 61–62. 
 31 In fact, the historical record is replete with evidence that the Founders had a decidedly 
narrow view of the scope of the freedom of speech and an ambivalent attitude toward 
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require much more than robust protection for an individual’s right to speak 
freely.32 They understood all too well the importance of collective political 
conduct, in particular, as a means to check the abuse of government power.33 
Not surprisingly, the Amendment they adopted protects the rights of peaceable 
assembly, petition and, by extension, association, as well as freedom of 
religious conscience and the press.34  
Once again, this has practical implications for constitutional interpretation 
and doctrine. The First Amendment protects a range of prerequisites for 
responsive and accountable governance: it protects individual autonomy and 
expression, but equally the ability to act in concert with others to demand 
responsiveness and accountability from government.35 The doctrine, 
therefore, ought to give due weight to preserving the balance between these 
various conditions, each of which furthers the capacity for self-governance.  
Individuals’ free speech rights ought not be so great as to undermine the 
co-equal rights secured by the text of the First Amendment, either directly or 
indirectly. This is especially the case insofar as there is good evidence that the 
Founders were much more concerned about protecting collective political 
action, as compared to individual speech or religious exercise.36 
                                                                                                                     
protecting acts of individual expression. See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY: LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1963); DAVID 
M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS (1997). 
 32 Bhagwat, supra note 6, at 1111 (arguing that “each of the five rights protected by the 
non-religious parts of the [First] Amendment—speech, press, association, assembly, and 
petition” has independent significance, even as “each . . . has as its primary goal the 
advancement of democratic self-governance”). See generally Abu El-Haj, The Neglected 
Right of Assembly, supra note 26 (exploring the political origins of the right of assembly and 
arguing it was established to protect social and political practices central to representative 
government). 
 33 See e.g., Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly, supra note 26, at 547 (noting 
that the right to assembly serves to protect collective action as a “mechanism to influence 
and check government”); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 
1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 529–44 (elaborating on the Founders’ concerns about the 
ability to check abuses of government power and arguing that these concerns should inform 
doctrinal approaches to both the speech and press clauses). 
 34 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 35 To be clear, the claim is not that the First Amendment protects all conditions 
necessary to self-governance. It does not, for instance, guarantee the right to vote, even as it 
is certainly another necessary condition of a republican form of government. Instead, the 
Constitution leaves the protection of voting rights to the several states, backed up by the 
Guarantee Clause and Congress’s ability to enforce it through the rejection of congressional 
delegations. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in 
this Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .”). 
 36 See generally Abu El-Haj, All Assemble, supra note 26, at 969–93 (reviewing early 
American law and finding that nineteenth-century state courts were consistently receptive to 
the revolutionary pedigree of the sovereign people’s right to demonstrate their collective 
political strength on the street, even as they upheld laws that we today would consider 
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C. Costs of Pluralism in First Amendment Theory 
Few would deny that enabling self-governance is a core purpose of the 
First Amendment.37 Nevertheless, many have worried that an exclusive 
emphasis on the self-governance interest provides too narrow a conception of 
the freedom of speech. As a result, the notion that the First Amendment has 
multiple ends, including fostering a competitive marketplace of ideas and 
protecting individual autonomy, has flourished. The scholarly faith appears to 
be that asserting these other values to justify the expansion of free speech 
doctrine will not undermine its contribution to self-governance.38  
First Amendment pluralism, however, provides few meaningful limits on 
the freedom of speech, thereby crowding out space for self-governance. Both 
the metaphor of an unfettered marketplace of ideas and the emphasis on 
individual expression and autonomy make it exceedingly difficult to articulate 
a principled justification for denying coverage to any speech.39 The doctrinal 
result has been to cast the First Amendment’s protections in a decidedly 
libertarian light. Having conceded on coverage, determining the level of 
protection becomes an all too familiar freewheeling balancing calculus, in 
which liberals are rarely persuaded that speech rights can be outweighed by a 
compelling state interest in order, morality, or protecting children, while 
conservatives are equally unpersuaded that they should give way to an interest 
in preserving equality.  
The principal setback to the self-governance theory was the way that its 
early adherents articulated its implications. Early accounts appeared to 
advocate for a doctrinal order in which First Amendment coverage would be 
limited to speech of clear political import.40 While Robert Bork stoked the fear 
by embracing this conclusion, the early works of Alexander Meiklejohn can 
                                                                                                                     
outrageous infringements on individual free expression and religious liberty); Abu El-Haj, 
The Neglected Right of Assembly, supra note 26, at 569–79 (same).  
 37 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“Whatever differences may exist about 
interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major 
purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”). 
 38 See, e.g., Paul G. Stern, Note, A Pluralistic Reading of the First Amendment and Its 
Relation to Public Discourse, 99 YALE L.J. 925, 929–44 (1990) (usefully synthesizing the 
rise of First Amendment pluralism and arguing that the First Amendment should be 
expanded to “advance the process of individual self-definition”). 
 39 Cf. Blasi, supra note 33, at 545–48 (noting the tendency of the autonomy interest to 
lead to absolutist views of First Amendment rights because the essence of autonomy is the 
freedom of choice itself).  
 40 E.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
IND. L.J. 1, 20, 27 (1971) (arguing that First Amendment “protection should be accorded 
only to speech that is explicitly political,” defined as speech “concerned with governmental 
behavior, policy or personnel,” and further that “[t]here is no basis for judicial intervention 
to protect any other form of expression, be it scientific, literary . . . obscene or 
pornographic”). 
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certainly be read in that same light. In 1948, for example, Meiklejohn 
explained:  
The guarantee given by the First Amendment is not, then, assured to all 
speaking. It is assured only to speech which bears, directly or indirectly, upon 
issues with which voters have to deal—only, therefore, to the consideration 
of matters of public interest. Private speech, or private interest in speech, on 
the other hand, has no claim whatever to the protection of the First 
Amendment.41  
The basic parameters of coverage were thus established as turning on an 
assessment of the political relevance of the speech or association. The problem 
for many was that this appeared to leave in the lurch expression that, while 
only indirectly bearing on politics, is critically important to a functioning 
liberal democracy.42  
A properly theorized self-governance interest need not result in such a 
cramped conception of the First Amendment. For one, it does not compel that 
doctrinal distinctions turn on differentiating between political and nonpolitical 
speech, association, or assembly. This is neither the only nor the best account 
of what it means to commit to the self-governance rationale in adjudicating 
First Amendment claims.  
Instead, a doctrine attentive to the primacy of the self-governance interest 
would respect the fundamental tension between positive and negative liberty: 
it would assure both sufficient autonomy in civil society such that the inputs 
into our republic institutions are not merely an affirmation of what elected 
bodies have in mind and leave ample space for democratic deliberation.43 First 
Amendment protections would extend, to refine on Robert Post’s formulation, 
to those forms of communication and conduct (for example, voting, protests, 
and association) that enable the “democratic state [to] remain[] responsive” 
and accountable “to the views of its citizens.”44 Entrenchment through 
government tampering with the authenticity of any inputs—individual 
conscience and character, information, viewpoints, civic and political 
associations, and elections—would be prohibited. And yet, care would be 
taken to ensure that those prohibitions did not encroach on the legislative right 
to provide education, regulate markets, and maintain public safety—even as 
                                                                                                                     
 41 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 
94 (Kennikat Press 1972) (1948) (emphasis added). 
 42 Meiklejohn himself came to recognize this limitation, and later in life, he adopted a 
much more expansive view of what fell within the ambit of politically relevant information. 
See, e.g., Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 
245, 255–57, 262–63 (1961). 
 43 See infra Part III.A. 
 44 Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 
4 (2000). 
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those choices indeed create policy feedbacks that shape to some degree each 
of the inputs into politics. 
Framed in this way, the fear that the self-governance interest precludes 
protection for individual expression and autonomy—for example, for the 
arts—is clearly overstated. Individual autonomy has long been recognized as 
a prerequisite for the independence necessary for a functioning liberal 
democracy.45 As Justice Kennedy is disposed to explain, our constitutional 
order “presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, 
expression, and certain intimate conduct” and provides for “a realm of 
personal liberty which the government may not enter.”46 
Exactly how capacious the self-governance interest could be is a 
conversation for another time. For now, it suffices to say that any reasonable 
articulation of the self-governance interest would provide ample justification 
for protecting artistic expression, perhaps even private journals.47 To the 
degree that speech and expressive conduct are often central media through 
which to express “personal dignity and autonomy,”48 it follows that speech 
that is central to the “defin[ition of] one’s own concept of existence, of 
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life” warrants First 
Amendment protection because such “[b]eliefs . . . define the attributes of 
personhood.”49 Protection would turn on the centrality of particular expression 
to the requisite individual autonomy and freedom of conscience necessary for 
democratic citizenship, not on whether the expression has direct value to 
democratic debate and participation.50  
III. RECONCEIVING FIRST AMENDMENT BOUNDARIES AND PROTECTIONS 
The self-governance interest, unlike its competitors, offers a historically 
grounded and theoretically principled account of the limits to First 
Amendment rights. By providing both a measure with which to assess the 
appropriate reach of the First Amendment and an intratextual set of 
considerations that ought to inform doctrinal choices regarding levels of 
individual protection, it offers a path back from the libertarian precipice to 
which the Roberts Court has taken the doctrine. 
                                                                                                                     
 45 See Meiklejohn, supra note 42, at 263. 
 46 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 578 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood of 
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992)). 
 47 See Bhagwat, supra note 4, at 855. 
 48 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851). 
 49 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. 
 50 See, e.g., Erotic Serv. Provider Legal Educ. & Research Project v. Gascon, No. C 15-
01007 JSW, 2016 WL 1258638, at *3–6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2016) (refusing to draw on 
Lawrence v. Texas to find that California’s criminalization of prostitution and its ban on 
solicitation infringed the freedom of association and freedom of speech, respectively).  
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The First Amendment establishes a defined set of individual rights in order 
to secure a set of conditions understood to be necessary for self-governance. 
It follows a fortiori that individual rights under the Amendment cannot be so 
extensive as to undermine either the larger project of self-governance or the 
very preconditions protected by the co-equal rights secured under the 
Amendment. 
Measured by these standards, the Roberts Court’s expansive First 
Amendment jurisprudence has been a colossal failure. By signaling a strong 
presumption of coverage for anything that arguably could be considered 
speech in everyday English, legislation once understood to be well within the 
bounds of democratic decision-making—such as rules adopted to govern 
economic markets—has been recast as potentially violating individual speech 
rights and thus beyond legislative competence.51 The result has been a well-
documented explosion of First Amendment challenges to what used to be 
considered mundane tools of economic regulation, including compelled 
disclosures, liability for disseminating misinformation, and standard setting 
for licensed professionals.52 At the same time, the level of protection in certain 
long-standing domains of First Amendment coverage has been significantly 
beefed up, frequently by decisions only barely tethered to the traditional 
rationales of First Amendment protection.53  
The consequences for our democracy are dire: policymakers are 
increasingly hamstrung in their regulatory choices even as the Court is busy 
undermining collective political practices protected by other aspects of the 
Amendment, most prominently unionism. 
A. Preserving Contested Spaces of Self-Governance  
While the First Amendment restricts certain types of legislative actions 
(for example, advance censorship of the press), these restrictions are 
established to maintain the integrity of the policy space our constitutions grant 
to legislatures—not to undercut that policy space. Each provision is in place 
to ensure responsiveness and to prevent entrenchment, whether of individuals, 
parties, or viewpoints. The freedom of the press and speech are protected in 
                                                                                                                     
 51 Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 1624 (2015) (noting that, in a series of recent cases, the Court 
has shunned efforts to extend the concept of low-value speech and that this has been taken 
to signal “a strong presumption of [First Amendment] coverage”). 
 52 Id. at 1614–16; Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133 (2016). 
Contra Jane R. Bambauer & Derek E. Bambauer, Information Libertarianism, 105 CAL. L. 
REV. 335, 354–56 (2017) (“Even when the First Amendment applies, it leaves many 
regulatory regimes affecting speech unscathed.”). 
 53 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2237 (2015) (Kagan, J., concurring) 
(critiquing the majority’s approach as blunt insofar as it fails to tailor the application of strict 
scrutiny to facially content-based regulations of speech to the “rationales” that underpin First 
Amendment caselaw). 
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order to ensure an open debate leading up to both elections and legislative 
votes.54 The freedom of assembly and the right of association afford American 
citizens the opportunity to take collective action to shape both electoral and 
legislative outcomes.55  
Insofar as the Amendment was established to maintain the constitutionally 
provided space for self-governance, difficult questions pertaining to the scope 
of First Amendment rights are more easily resolved when recast in the register 
of separation of powers. The text’s prohibition on “abridging the freedom of 
speech”56 is not self-explicating. It falls to the judiciary to determine when the 
proviso is implicated. When considering brash First Amendment claims, 
judges ought to refrain from reaching decisions that constitutionalize choices 
delegated in our system of government to the democratic process.57  
First Amendment rights must be adjudicated pursuant to doctrinal rules 
attendant to preserving the capacity of legislatures to serve their most basic 
constitutional function—reaching provisional decisions after deliberation 
about contested values. This requires both that judicial interpretations prevent 
government officials from interfering with the processes and domains that 
ensure that outputs of the democratic process are responsive to popular will 
and that elected officials can be replaced as necessary, and that judicial 
interpretations do not oust legislatures from their central constitutional 
function. 
No doubt some will be inclined to object that this framing effectively 
nullifies the First Amendment. To the degree that moral regulation, health and 
safety regulation, education, and poor and elderly relief—no less than 
economic regulation—are quintessentially legislative judgments, what is left 
in the First Amendment’s domain?  
While descriptively, this point is unquestionably right, its implied 
conclusion misses the mark. The default rule in a republican form of 
government is that policy choices are reserved for the legislature. The proper 
question, therefore, is not what is within the legislative domain, but rather how 
do we decide what has been excluded from the legislative domain. This 
reframing radically simplifies the inquiry. First, there are those substantive 
legislative choices that the Constitution affirmatively removes from legislative 
consideration.58 The Reconstruction Amendments provide the clearest 
illustrations. The Thirteenth Amendment forbids legislatures from creating an 
                                                                                                                     
 54 Bhagwat, supra note 6, at 1103–04. 
 55 Abu El-Haj, All Assemble, supra note 26, at 1030–32; Bhagwat, supra note 19, at 
1106. 
 56 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 57 For an instance where three Justices acknowledge the importance of separation of 
powers in this setting, see United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 754 (2012) (Alito, J., 
dissenting). 
 58 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting 
that “[t]here may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality 
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution”). 
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economy based on slavery, whatever its economic efficiencies.59 The 
Fourteenth Amendment creates a precommitment to civil equality, the precise 
scope of which remains contested.60 Second, beyond these substantive 
precommitments, the very structure of the republican project precludes 
legislatures from insulating themselves from political challenge.61 Efforts to 
entrench, directly or indirectly, either officials, parties, or policies constitute a 
constitutional foul.62  
The fallacy driving the Roberts Court’s expansive First Amendment 
doctrine is its assumption that the Amendment falls into the first category—
that it provides a substantive injunction on speech regulation,63 not unlike the 
Constitution’s prohibition on the quartering of soldiers64 or the suspension of 
habeas corpus.65 Under current First Amendment doctrine, for example, 
“speech proposing a commercial transaction” is simply presumed to raise First 
Amendment concerns.66 As a result, regulations that place restrictions on 
                                                                                                                     
 59 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
 60 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Certain provisions of the original Constitution function 
similarly. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall 
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may 
require it. No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed. No Capitation, or other 
direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census . . . .”).  
 61 Cf. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (speculating that “legislation which 
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of 
undesirable legislation, [ought] to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny” and 
offering as examples “restrictions upon the right to vote, . . . restraints upon the 
dissemination of information, . . . interferences with political organizations, [and] 
prohibition[s] of peaceable assembly”). 
 62 Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (objecting that “the amendment 
imposes a special disability upon . . . [h]omosexuals [by] forbid[ding them] the safeguards 
that others enjoy” insofar as “[t]hey can obtain specific protection against discrimination 
only by enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to amend the State Constitution”); Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. 186, 258–59 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring) (arguing that judicial intervention 
“into so delicate a field” was appropriate only because “the majority of the people of 
Tennessee have no ‘practical opportunities for exerting their political weight at the polls’ to 
correct” the egregious legislative malapportionment (quoting MacDougall v. Green, 335 
U.S. 281, 284 (1948) (per curiam)). 
 63 In this regard, it is arguably relevant that the text does not prohibit the regulation of 
speech per se, but rather the making of laws that “abridge[] the freedom of speech.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
 64 U.S. CONST. amend. III. 
 65 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 66 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637, 650–51 (1985) 
(quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)); Cent. Hudson Gas & 
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561–63 (1980) (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. 
at 456); see also Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 28–30 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(en banc) (Rogers, J., concurring) (explaining why First Amendment doctrine distinguishes 
between commercial disclosure requirements, governed by Zauderer, and regulations that 
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commercial advertising, but also those that impose disclosure requirements, 
are subject to relatively searching scrutiny.  
The First Amendment is better understood, however, as an effort to make 
explicit the structural point that a republican form of government requires a 
functioning democratic process. Efforts to restrict the press, public discourse, 
or peaceable assemblies as well as the regulation of civic associations, 
political parties, and elections are presumed unconstitutional. But this is not 
because the Amendment has taken a particular set of choices off the legislative 
agenda, so much as because it guarantees that all options are available for 
public consideration. In order for democratic outputs to reflect popular will, 
and to ensure that elected officials can be ousted when they do not, courts must 
enjoin government interference with these political and cultural processes and 
domains.  
While exploring the full doctrinal implications of this reframing is beyond 
the scope of a symposium piece, its basic contours can be discerned by 
reconsidering First Amendment challenges to what were, until recently, 
understood to be run-of-the-mill market regulations.  
A doctrine attendant to balancing the First Amendment’s prohibition on 
political entrenchment with a vindication of positive liberty in the legislature 
would maintain the presumption of constitutionality with respect to economic 
regulation, even when speech is implicated.67 Any other approach risks 
significantly undermining our constitutional commitment to leave contested 
economic policy choices to the legislature. As with the New Deal Court’s 
rejection of Lochner, the scaling back of First Amendment rights flows from 
the momentous value of the positive liberties at stake rather than from a 
determination that “the personal liberties at issue [are] unimportant.”68  
Regulating economic markets, whether in the form of workers’ rights, 
consumer protection, or securities regulation, is a quintessential legislative 
prerogative. The ability of “elected officials . . . to set the rules for the 
economy and establish its boundaries” is, as Deborah Hellman notes, the very 
                                                                                                                     
burden commercial speech, governed by Central Hudson, in an effort to push back on the 
invitation to collapse the two doctrines). 
 67 Cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 486–87 (1955) 
(“The . . . law [at issue] may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many cases. But it is 
for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new 
requirement. . . . The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws . . . because they may be unwise or 
improvident, of out of harmony with a particular school of thought.”). 
 68 Hellman, supra note 13, at 234–35 (arguing that “[r]ather than focusing on the 
relative vulnerability of the negative liberty infringed, perhaps we should focus on the 
significance of the positive liberty that is exercised” and, as such, “the cases of the Lochner 
era were properly rejected not because the personal liberties at issue were 
unimportant . . . but instead because the liberty of self-government at stake was so 
momentous”); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 589 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (recognizing that the Court’s development of the commercial speech doctrine 
was reopening Lochner’s Pandora’s box). 
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essence of the positive liberty of self-governance.69 In the contemporary era, 
information regulation is not only an accepted, but a preferred, tool in the 
repertoire of light-touch regulatory approaches. Markets can only achieve 
allocative efficiency if consumers are informed. In the absence of information 
regulation, consumers in many markets face an array of obstacles when it 
comes to securing optimal information, resulting in various collective action 
problems.70  
Not surprisingly, economic legislation today frequently involves the 
regulation of speech. The government frequently requires manufacturers of 
products, from cigarettes and pharmaceuticals to securities and meat, to 
provide consumers with information and to disclose risk.71 Employers are 
routinely asked to provide information to employees about their statutory 
rights,72 and corporations are regularly forced to disclose their financials and 
other information material to investors.73 Legislatures also often restrict the 
marketing practices of firms.74 
A presumption of constitutionality for each of these laws, all of which can 
reasonably be characterized as regulations of commerce, would derive from 
the recognition that markets can be regulated in many ways, and that 
legislatures are the appropriate forum for determining not just the ends of 
regulation, but also the means of achieving those goals.75 Compelled 
disclosure of information to enhance market efficiency or public safety, for 
instance, would be presumptively constitutional, not because it does not 
involve speech that could contribute to public discourse, but because 
information regulation—whether in the form of a prohibition on false and 
misleading information or a demand for truthful disclosure—is a critical 
regulatory tool.76  
                                                                                                                     
 69 Hellman, supra note 13, at 233–34 (“The regulation of the economy is a central 
aspect of self-government.”). 
 70 E.g., Christopher Robertson, The Tip of the Iceberg: A First Amendment Right To 
Promote Drugs Off-Label, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1019, 1045–46 (2017) (noting the collective 
action problems the public would face determining the safety of drugs in the absence of the 
Food Drug & Cosmetics Act’s premarket requirement that drugmakers provide evidence of 
the safety and efficacy of drugs). 
 71 See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)–(d) (2012) (setting securities 
disclosure requirements for certain small transactions); Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, 21 
U.S.C. § 352 (2012) (defining drug labeling requirements); 9 C.F.R. § 317.1–.2 (2011) 
(outlining labeling requirements for meat products). 
 72 E.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1903.2 (2009) (requiring employers to post notices informing 
employees of their rights under the Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970.) 
 73 E.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77h (2012). 
 74 E.g., Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45–58 (2012). 
 75 See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 234 (1994). 
 76 See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(upholding disclosure requirements against compelled speech challenge in recognition, 
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Many of the Court’s commercial speech cases appear misguided in this 
light. The Court’s recent decision in Expressions Hair Design v. 
Scheneiderman, for example, would come out differently.77 To the degree that 
New York is permitted to prefer credit card transactions over cash 
transactions, why should it be hamstrung in its efforts to utilize the lessons of 
behavioral psychology, which show that individuals react more strongly to 
surcharges than discounts, in its efforts to ensure that credit card customers 
are not penalized for refusing to pay cash?78 The critical point is that the 
legislative prerogative extends to both legislative ends and means. The fact, 
therefore, that New York’s law “is not like a typical price regulation,” insofar 
as it chooses to “regulate . . . how sellers may communicate their prices,” does 
not change the fundamental economic character of the law.79 
The same is true for cigarette advertising.80 To the degree that it is within 
the legislative power to ban cigarettes for any nonarbitrary reason, it should 
also be within its power to ban the advertisement of cigarettes (or to do so only 
near schools in an effort to protect children from forming an addiction).81 
Advertising is central to the economic viability of a business; as such, the 
regulation of advertising is a quintessential form of market regulation. 
Notice how this approach differs significantly from traditional approaches 
to determining levels of scrutiny in First Amendment law. Nothing turns here 
on whether the rights bearer is “speaking” in some colloquial sense or on the 
relative value of that speech.82 It does not deny that commercial speech can 
                                                                                                                     
among other things, of the governmental interest in “enabling customers to make informed 
choices”).  
 77 Cf. Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1151 (2017) 
(remanding to lower court, having determined that the regulation was in fact a regulation of 
speech, and not conduct, to determine in the first instance whether to apply Central Hudson 
or Zauderer). 
 78 See id. at 1155 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 79 Id. at 1150–51 (majority opinion). 
 80 But see Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Liquormart, Inc. v. 
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996). 
 81 This was the Supreme Court’s position early on with respect to commercial 
advertising. E.g., Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 345–46 
(1986) (“In our view, the greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily 
includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling . . . .”).  
 82 Cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978) (“We have not 
discarded the ‘commonsense’ distinction between speech proposing a commercial 
transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other 
varieties of speech. To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and 
noncommercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force 
of the Amendment’s guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech. Rather than subject 
the First Amendment to such a devitalization, we instead have afforded commercial speech 
a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of 
First Amendment values, while allowing modes of regulation that might be impermissible in 
the realm of noncommercial expression.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). 
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have a political valiance or that commercial activities often have expressive 
elements.83  
The presumption of constitutionality follows from the fact that economic 
regulation is the domain of politics—the domain of political outputs—and 
from a worry that to proceed as if all speech was within “the freedom of 
speech” is to significantly undermine the republican project for which the likes 
of Patrick Henry and John Stark fought.84 The doctrinal task is to respect this 
tension by providing both robust and confined First Amendment rights. 
Official efforts to compromise political inputs, broadly construed, must be 
struck down to underwrite the legitimacy of the products of the political 
domain, but the resulting First Amendment rights must not be so great as to 
remove contested and contestable economic and moral choices from our 
democratic institutions. 
The line between regulatory outputs and political inputs, to be sure, is not 
always bright. Economic regulation that explicitly targets speech arguably 
distorts political debate and thus implicates political inputs.85 Some 
vehemently argue, for instance, that the Food and Drug Administration’s 
(FDA) restrictions on nutritional labeling influence the current political 
controversy over nutrition by framing sugars as “bad food”86 or by glossing 
over distinctions between good and bad fat.87 Similarly, the FDA’s effort to 
discourage off-label promotion by pharmaceutical representatives arguably 
shapes the debate about the value of off-label prescribing.88  
Regardless of whether one finds these particular examples persuasive, the 
doctrine clearly needs a mechanism for reversing the default presumption in 
instances where economic regulation targeting speech substantially 
                                                                                                                     
 83 Samuel R. Bagenstos, Essay, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public 
Accommodation Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1231–32 (2014); Richard A. Epstein, The 
Constitutional Perils of Moderation: The Case of the Boy Scouts, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 119, 
139–40 (2000); see also, e.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. 
App. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights 
Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017); Elaine Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 
2013). But see Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 556–57 (Wash. 2017) 
(noting that commercial sale of goods or services is not presumptively expressive). 
 84 See supra, notes 11, 14 and accompanying text.  
 85 See Toni M. Massaro, Tread on Me!, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 365, 407–12 (2014) 
(offering a range of examples where run-of-the-mill government regulation arguably 
influences the marketplace of ides by “shaping, prohibiting, or outright compelling speech”). 
 86 See, e.g., Sherzod Abdukadirov, The FDA Overreaches with New Food Label, HILL 
(Mar. 5, 2015), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/healthcare/234580-the-fda-overreaches-with-
new-food-label [https://perma.cc/843B-VL6A]. 
 87 See, e.g., Allison Aubrey, Why the FDA Is Re-Evaluating the Nutty Definition of 
“Healthy” Food, NPR (May 10, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/05/10/ 
477514200/why-the-fda-is-reevaluating-the-nutty-definition-of-healthy-food [https://perma.cc/ 
NP9W-NE99]. 
 88 See Robertson, supra note 70, at 1020–25. 
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compromises political inputs. Equal Protection doctrine already recognizes 
this need for analogous reasons.89  
The public forum’s time, place, and manner doctrine could easily be 
adapted to this end. Currently, it operates to reverse the default presumption 
of unconstitutionality with respect to government regulation of public spaces 
long central to cultural and political democracy.90 Equally significantly, it 
does so out of respect for the legislative prerogative to maintain order.91 The 
doctrine, in other words, already polices the same boundary—distinguishing 
between the legislature’s constitutional prerogative to pass civil and criminal 
laws genuinely related to order maintenance and the constitutional prohibition 
on attempts to undermine political responsiveness or electoral accountability. 
The government’s right to regulate public forums in the interest of order 
maintenance is recognized so long as two critical conditions are met—the 
regulation is viewpoint neutral and adequate alternative means for expression 
are available.92 Each of these conditions serves to guarantee that the regulation 
is not an illicit effort to quash public discourse or assembly.  
The time, place, and, manner doctrine suggests that the presumption of 
constitutionality for economic regulation should be reversed only when 
disgruntled regulated parties lack adequate alternative means with which to 
persuade the government to change course. Economic policy is inevitably not 
viewpoint neutral. Thus, the traditional requirement of viewpoint neutrality 
does not translate well into this new context. The requirement of viewpoint 
neutrality only makes sense where the government seeks special dispensation 
to undertake the inherently suspect project of regulating quintessential 
democratic spaces.93 By contrast, the very reason for requiring policymaking 
                                                                                                                     
 89 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (holding that 
notwithstanding the presumption of constitutionality for non-suspect classifications, the 
constitutional obligation to prove “‘equal protection of the laws’ . . . must at the very least 
mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute 
a legitimate governmental interest”). 
 90 Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (observing that “streets 
and parks . . . have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of 
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, 
and discussing public questions” but holding that this privilege “is not absolute”). 
 91 Id. at 515–16 (explaining further that “[t]he privilege of a citizen . . . to use the streets 
and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest 
of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general 
comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in 
the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied”). 
 92 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (noting that reasonable 
time, place, and manner restrictions are constitutional “in a public forum” so long as they 
were not “adopted . . . because of disagreement with the message it convey[ed]” and “they 
leave open ample alternative channels for communication” (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for 
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984))). 
 93 Even R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul is not to the contrary. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
Notwithstanding its bold proclamation that the state may never regulate speech “based on 
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to go through a majoritarian process in a liberal democracy is to legitimate 
such partiality. 
As in Equal Protection doctrine, reversal would be the exception, not the 
rule. The First Amendment has never demanded an unfettered right to speak. 
Even political speakers are regularly burdened by the requirement to gather at 
more convenient locations and less disruptive times, to lower their 
microphones, and to limit the contributions they give and accept.94 These 
burdens on the time, place, and manner of speech, assembly, and association 
do not constitute constitutional fouls, even where they diminish opportunities 
for expression.  
The proper course for those disgruntled with particular disclosure regimes 
or pricing preferences is more politics—speech, association, assembly, and 
voting. Thus, even an outright prohibition on off-label promotion by 
pharmaceutical representatives and their agents (such as doctors remunerated 
for their advocacy), with or without a prohibition of off-label prescribing, 
would likely meet the proposed test.95 Pharmaceutical companies are free to 
                                                                                                                     
hostility—or favoritism—towards the underlying message expressed,” even in R.A.V. Justice 
Scalia includes a lengthy discussion of exceptions to this broad statement. See id. at 386, 
388, 390 (concluding that “it may not even be necessary to identify any particular ‘neutral’ 
basis, so long as the nature of the content discrimination is such that there is no realistic 
possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot”). More importantly, R.A.V. should not 
be viewed as a case involving the regulation of unprotected fighting words, notwithstanding 
the Court’s framing. R.A.V.’s holding (like that in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)) 
makes much more sense when one acknowledges that the central question in the case was 
whether the assembly was constitutionally protected or unlawful. R.A.V. involved a group of 
teenagers that burned a cross in the yard of one of their neighbors, a black family. 505 U.S. 
at 379. Likewise, Johnson burned the flag while protesting at the 1984 Republican National 
Convention in Dallas. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399. Both cases, in other words, are instances 
where the state sought to render certain assemblies per se unlawful. While mobs are not 
constitutionally protected, there is no question that it would be problematic to defer to the 
government on the line between a criminal mob and a constitutionally protected assembly 
insofar as this involves direct regulation of an explicitly protected channel of democratic 
politics—let alone to permit viewpoint-based discrimination in making that determination. 
 94 E.g., Ward, 491 U.S at 784 (upholding New York City’s “attempt to regulate the 
volume of amplified music at the bandshell so the performances are satisfactory to the 
audience without intruding upon those who use the Sheep Meadow or live on Central Park 
West and in its vicinity”); Buckley v. Valeo, 421 U.S. 1, 23–38 (1976) (upholding 
congressional effort to limit campaign contributions to candidates and political parties); Cox 
v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (upholding a municipal requirement that 
processions obtain a license, as a constitutional regulation of the time, place, and manner of 
public assembly, where official discretion was sufficiently circumscribed)); see also 
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 121 (1972). 
 95 But cf. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 168 (2d Cir. 2012) (“constru[ing] the 
misbranding provisions of the FDCA as not prohibiting and criminalizing . . . truthful off-
label promotion of FDA-approved prescription drugs” in light of First Amendment 
concerns); accord Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011) (asserting that 
“[s]peech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing . . . is a form of expression protected by the 
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment” and proceeding to analyze the restriction as a 
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lobby the FDA to change its policies with respect to off-label promotion, and 
more broadly to the very requirement of premarket FDA approval. They are 
able to raise their complaints in Congress should the FDA be unreceptive, and 
they can certainly engage in an issue campaign to persuade the public of the 
benefits of off-label prescribing (including with specific examples). 
Pharmaceutical companies and their allies in the foundation world can fund 
research and publications on the benefits of off-label prescribing,96 and allied 
doctors can speak in their private capacities to the issue. The only thing an off-
label promotion ban precludes is ostensibly truthful dissembling regarding the 
merits of off-label prescribing during sales pitches for specific drugs targeted 
at doctors or patients.97 By contrast, the application of California’s 
prohibitions against false and misleading advertising to “Nike’s press releases 
and letters to newspaper editors . . . addressed to the public generally”98 likely 
warranted a reversal of the presumption of constitutionality, insofar as it 
burdened Nike’s ability to effectively respond to public allegations that the 
company’s overseas factories routinely violated workers’ rights.99  
The harder cases are those involving regulations that defy easy 
categorization. Consider first, First National Bank v. Bellotti, which involved 
a challenge to a Massachusetts statute that prohibited banks and certain other 
business corporations from making expenditures in relation to ballot 
measures.100 While most of us are likely to view this statute as regulating 
electoral politics, Justice White argued, in dissent, that it ought to be viewed 
                                                                                                                     
content- and speaker-based restriction subject to strict scrutiny). In fact, it is precisely 
because there are good reasons to permit doctors to prescribe off-label that the FDA should 
be permitted to discourage off-label promotion to offset zealous and reckless advertising, 
without having to prohibit physicians from using their professional discretion in prescribing. 
For the policy benefits associated with permitting off-label prescribing and the difficulties 
of producing requisite studies for certain populations (pregnant women, children, and 
individuals with aggressive cancers), see Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 
196, 200–03 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (involving off-label promotion of uses for which Amarin 
specifically failed to receive FDA approval). 
 96 Under current law, pharmaceutical companies’ ability to “disseminat[e] . . . off-label 
information though scientific journals” is explicitly recognized by the FDA. Caronia, 703 
F.3d at 166–67. 
 97 False or misleading representations about off-label usages are prohibited and are “not 
entitled to First Amendment protection.” Id. at 165 n.10. But cf. United States v. Alvarez, 
567 U.S. 709, 730 (2012) (holding the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 ran afoul of the First 
Amendment insofar as it criminalized false statements about military honors received). 
 98 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 258 (Cal. 2002). 
 99 This point was made clearly by the dissent. Id. at 263 (Chin, J., dissenting). Under 
current doctrine, the inclusion of public issue advocacy does not inoculate speech proposing 
a commercial transaction from the more lenient Central Hudson test. See Zauderer v. Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 & n.7 (1985) (noting that “advertising which 
‘links a product to a current public debate’ is not thereby entitled to the constitutional 
protection afforded noncommercial speech” (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5 (1980))). 
 100 First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767–68 (1978). 
938 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:4 
as an innocuous effort to restrict corporate waste.101 As a theoretical matter, 
at least, this characterization was not entirely implausible. Most corporate law 
seeks to prevent corporate managers from using corporate funds for personal 
gain or indulgences, and the law in question provided an exception for ballot 
measures “materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the 
corporation.”102 Even so, the opportunities for entrenchment associated with 
efforts to regulate the financing of elections cautions in favor of a bright-line 
rule that all efforts to regulate elections be met with a presumption of 
unconstitutionality. 
Consider next laws that prevent public accommodations from 
discriminating. On the one hand, the legislative prerogative to regulate 
markets is clear and includes the authority to predicate eligibility to participate 
in the market on any number of conditions—from the agreement to pay a fair 
wage to an openness to contract with individuals regardless of race, sex, 
political affiliation, pregnancy status, or sexual orientation.103 On the other 
hand, anti-discrimination laws reflect, but also entrench, a particular set of 
values, and in the context of civil society, this distorts, possibly intentionally, 
political inputs. The pertinent question regarding which presumption to apply 
at the outset, in other words, turns on whether such public accommodation 
laws are best understood as regulating an economic transaction or as imposing 
liberal values of tolerance. The former would give rise to the presumption of 
constitutionality while the latter would trigger strict scrutiny insofar as it seeks 
to impose a particular worldview on civil society. The answer will depend on 
context.104 Notice, however, that nothing would turn on drawing a line 
                                                                                                                     
 101 Id. at 812–13 (White, J., dissenting) (“Massachusetts has chosen to forbid corporate 
management from spending corporate funds in referenda elections absent some 
demonstrable effect of the issue on the economic life of the company. In short, corporate 
management may not use corporate monies to promote what does not further corporate 
affairs but what in the last analysis are the purely personal views of the management, 
individually or as a group.”). 
 102 Id. at 768 (majority opinion). 
 103 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 634 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The 
Constitution does not guarantee a right to choose employees, customers, suppliers, or those 
with whom one engages in simple commercial transactions, without restraint from the State. 
A shopkeeper has no constitutional right to deal only with persons of one sex.”). 
 104 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. offers the 
easiest of these cases insofar as it involved the application of a public accommodation law 
to a traditional form of peaceably assembly. 515 U.S. 557, 559 (1995). Parades have long 
been a central tradition of American politics, including ethnic politics starting in the 
nineteenth century, and thus are squarely within the public domain. As with campaign 
finance, therefore, there are good reasons to be skeptical of official efforts to shape them and 
the presumption of unconstitutionality should apply.  
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between economic and expressive associations—a distinction that has rightly 
been criticized as unstable.105  
The fact, however, that there will be difficult cases ought not distract from 
the fact that this account brings clarity to many core cases. The self-
governance interest explains why there ought to be a strong presumption of 
constitutionality when it comes to economic regulation. A statute that prevents 
businesses from discriminating in the hiring, firing, and promotion of 
employees is clearly commercial legislation. An FDA regulation that requires 
all over-the-counter drugs or all food produced in a factory to include a label 
with information about the ingredients and calorie counts is clearly market 
regulation aimed to compensate for consumers’ struggles to acquire needed 
information, regardless of whether the act of labeling is compelling speech. 
Similarly, regulations seeking to remedy inequalities in access to information, 
for instance by prohibiting employers from lying or making 
misrepresentations to their workers about their statutory rights or other 
employment conditions, are clearly regulations of employment contracting 
and ought to be presumed constitutional.106 
Absent a normative belief in First Amendment absolutism, the self-
governance rationale is theoretically optimal even as it does not eradicate the 
boundary questions that plague the doctrine. The line between economic 
regulation and the political process is not always bright. But no account of the 
First Amendment obviates the need for line drawing. Even the libertarian First 
Amendment’s plain language speech test does not entirely avoid the need to 
draw lines.107 The self-governance interest, at least, enables us to draw limits 
                                                                                                                     
 105 U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 634–35 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that the 
freedom of association only extends to those associations whose predominant purpose is 
expressive rather than commercial). 
 106 But see Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947, 959–63 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(holding that while employers’ right to silence is “sharply constrained” in the labor context, 
employers do not entirely forfeit that right), overruled in part on other grounds by Am. Meat 
Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 22–23 (D.C. Cir. 2014). See generally Helen 
Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace: Employer Speech and the First Amendment, 101 
MINN. L. REV. 31, 38–39 (2016) (explaining that employer speech does not cleanly fit within 
existing First Amendment theories, but proposing that the First Amendment authorizes the 
government to “require employers to disclose objectively verifiable information about 
workers’ rights and . . . working conditions, as well as to prohibit employer lies and 
misrepresentations about these matters that threaten to coerce or manipulate workers’ 
choices”). 
 107 Compare Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 (2017) 
(Breyer, J., concurring) (“When the government seeks to regulate those activities, it is often 
wiser not to try to distinguish between ‘speech’ and ‘conduct.’ Instead, we can, and normally 
do, simply ask whether, or how, a challenged statute, rule, or regulation affects an interest 
that the First Amendment protects.” (citation omitted)), with id. at 1150–51 (majority 
opinion) (attempting to clarify that “a law requiring all New York delis to charge $10 for 
their sandwiches . . . would regulate the sandwich seller’s conduct” despite the fact that it 
would require “a store . . . to put ‘$10 on its menus or have its employees tell customers that 
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in ways that the competing theoretical foundations for the freedom of speech 
cannot. That said, there is clearly much more theorizing to be done, especially 
with respect to the noneconomic domains of self-governance such as order 
maintenance and moral regulation where the risks of entrenchment may be 
greater.108  
B. Freedom of Speech and the Cognate First Amendment Rights 
A properly theorized self-governance interest, one grounded in the First 
Amendment as a whole, rather than the Free Speech Clause in isolation, offers 
a new vantage point from which to consider when, where, and why it might 
be appropriate to limit individual free speech rights. The basic insight is a 
simple one: the freedom of speech is neither the only nor the primary condition 
necessary for self-governance that the First Amendment protects; therefore, 
individual free speech rights cannot be so great as to undermine the other 
constitutionally protected prerequisites of self-governance, either directly or 
indirectly. Where First Amendment “interests lie on both sides of the legal 
equation,” courts must balance free speech rights against these other 
interests.109 
First Amendment doctrine and scholarship have succumbed to an 
unfortunately naïve account of the processes of self-governance in which the 
marketplace of ideas has been given an outsized role. Achieving representative 
government, especially with respect to policy outputs, is much harder in 
practice than in theory. Even where public discourse is unencumbered, myriad 
obstacles stand in the way of achieving responsive, responsible, and 
accountable political bodies. For one, citizens, as individuals, are busy, 
                                                                                                                     
price” because “the law’s effect on speech would be only incidental to its primary effect on 
conduct”). 
 108 See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (holding 
California’s effort to prohibit the sale or rental of violent video games to minors ran afoul of 
the First Amendment because, inter alia, “video games communicate ideas—and even social 
messages—through many familiar literary devices . . . and through features distinctive to the 
medium (such as the player’s interaction with the virtual world)”); United States v. Stevens, 
559 U.S. 460, 475–76, 481–82 (2010) (holding that a federal statute criminalizing the 
commercial creation, sale, or possession of certain depictions of animal cruelty was 
substantially overbroad and thus facially invalid under the First Amendment, especially as 
depictions of conduct lawful in one state could constitute illegal depictions in another state); 
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773–74 (1982) (upholding New York’s effort to 
criminalize the distribution of child pornography, notwithstanding that the statute did not 
require proof of obscenity, on the grounds that the state had a compelling interest in 
preventing sexual exploitation of minors and protecting children from the mental, physical, 
and sexual abuse associated with pornography).  
 109 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(“[W]here constitutionally protected interests lie on both sides of the legal equation . . . there 
is no place for a strong presumption against constitutionality.”). 
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distracted, and find it virtually impossible to effectively monitor what their 
elected officials are actually doing on the job.  
The critical role played by civic associations, including political parties, 
in offsetting these obstacles, especially when it comes to achieving policy 
responsiveness, is significantly underappreciated.110 Current doctrine, for 
example, recognizes only the importance of civic associations as speakers.111 
But associations do much more than represent views in our democracy. They 
draw citizens into politics through social ties; they reflect, shape, and represent 
preferences; and they resolve collective action problems associated with 
keeping informed about politics.112  
The absolutist trajectory of free speech protection threatens to undermine 
the strength of American civic associations and as a consequence, the 
informed political participation that is required for democratic accountability. 
And it does so despite the fact that the First Amendment squarely protects both 
interests—facilitating a robust marketplace of civic associations and 
facilitating informed political participation—through the right of peaceable 
assembly and the freedom of association.  
Yet, this dynamic is entirely obscured by the salient approaches to 
theorizing levels of free speech protection. To illustrate this phenomenon 
wherein the expansion of individual free speech rights has, substantially and 
predictably, undermined existing civic associations, and in turn, their ability 
to foster democratic accountability, let us revisit the Roberts Court’s 
receptiveness to individuals’ compelled speech claims against the state-
sanctioned practices of unions.  
First Amendment challenges to union practices have been on the rise. One 
line of attack has been on those state laws that require nonunion members, 
who benefit from the union’s collective bargaining efforts, to pay their fair 
share of the associated costs.113 Typically, in these cases, state law authorizes 
what are known as “agency shops.”114 Under an agency shop arrangement, 
individuals may maintain employment while refusing to join the union or pay 
                                                                                                                     
 110 See Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Beyond Campaign Finance Reform, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1127, 
1132, 1154–60 (2016); Bhagwat, supra note 6, at 1109. 
 111 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (explaining that 
the “[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial 
ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association”). 
 112 See Abu El-Haj, supra note 28, at 76–98 (reviewing the empirical literature on civic 
associations and summarizing its lessons regarding the dynamics of self-governance).  
 113 Currently, there are twenty-eight so-called “right to work” states in the country, 
which prevent unions from requiring nonmember employees to contribute their share to 
cover joint costs. Right To Work States, NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEF. FOUND. (2017), 
http://www.nrtw.org/right-to-work-states/ [https://perma.cc/P6G3-ZJ8R]. 
 114 See J. Michael Guenther, Labor Law—Union Security—The Agency Shop and State 
Right-To-Work Laws, 35 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 547, 547 (1960). 
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for its political activity; all employees, however, are required to pay a fair-
share service fee for representation in collective bargaining.115  
While the constitutionality of such fair-share service fee requirements has 
long been settled,116 a series of recent opinions, authored by Justice Alito, have 
invited renewed challenges to such provisions, on the grounds that the 
payment of such fees constitutes compelled speech in support of unionism.117 
Existing Supreme Court precedent views the matter differently. Abood v. 
Detroit Board of Education (1977) held that although it would be 
unconstitutional to compel nonunion members to pay fees to cover political 
and ideological projects, there is nothing constitutionally suspect about 
requiring nonmember employees to pay for services related to collective 
bargaining over terms and conditions of employment.118 In essence, Abood 
created a distinction, for First Amendment purposes, between unions as 
associations of employees (and therefore of employment-related advocacy) 
and unions as civic associations (and their related political advocacy).  
Recent challenges to compelled fair-share service fees challenge this 
distinction between unions, as economic actors that bargain, and unions, as 
civic associations that engage in political speech.119 Collective bargaining 
relating to terms and conditions of employment in the public sector, they 
claim, “is inherently ‘political.’”120 It is materially indistinguishable from 
lobbying; therefore, requiring nonunion employees to a pay fair-share service 
fee to a public union constitutes compelled subsidization of ideological 
speech. 
Abood’s central holding, however, is sound, exemplifying exactly the sort 
of balance between the freedom of speech and the freedom of association that 
a self-governance interest grounded in the First Amendment as a whole, rather 
than the free speech clause in isolation, demands. Under Abood, the nonunion 
employee’s right to oppose unionism is fully preserved.121 She is free to refuse 
to join the union (qua civic association) and free to refuse to subsidize its 
                                                                                                                     
 115 Id. 
 116 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
 117 See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644 (2014); Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 
Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 311 (2012); see also Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No. 13–
57095, 2014 WL 10076847, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2014), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) 
(per curiam) (affirmed by default pursuant to a four-four split). 
 118 Abood, 431 U.S. at 235–36. 
 119 See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun. Emps. Council 31, 851 F.3d 
746, 746–47 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 2017 WL 2483128 (Sept. 28, 2017) (seeking the 
overruling of Abood). 
 120 Abood, 431 U.S. at 227. 
 121 Id. at 230. 
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political speech.122 She is also free to join civic and political associations that 
oppose unionism.123 As Abood explained,  
A public employee who believes that a union representing him is urging 
a course that is unwise as a matter of public policy is not barred from 
expressing his viewpoint. Besides voting in accordance with his 
convictions, every public employee is largely free to express his views, 
in public or private, orally or in writing, . . . [Moreover,] public 
employees are free to participate in the full range of political activities 
open to other citizens.124  
At the same time, Abood preserves unions and the second-order benefits 
to democratic accountability that arise from them as civic associations.125 This 
is not because it falsely props up union membership, or subsidizes the union’s 
political speech, but rather because it prevents the significant collective action 
dilemmas that would arise under a more expansive account of individual free 
speech rights. 
Any decision expanding the compelled speech doctrine to protect 
nonunion members from being required to pay a fair-share service fee, by 
contrast, would lead quickly into the tragedy of the commons: prounion 
workers might make the economically rational decision to withhold their fees, 
hoping that others will fund the union, but rapidly undermining it. By 
upholding the constitutionality of the agency shop and fair-share service fees, 
Abood ensures that no one has an opportunity to free ride.126 Both union and 
nonunion employees are required to pay their fair share of the employment-
related representation the union has a duty to provide on an equal basis.  
Justice Alito is correct that “free-rider arguments . . . are generally 
insufficient to overcome First Amendment objections.”127 What he fails to 
recognize is that First Amendment interests lay on both sides of this conflict, 
and it is this that gives constitutional significance to the free-rider argument. 
Compelled fair-share service fees are necessary to counteract the very real 
free-rider problem that would arise among members and undermine unions in 
their absence.  
The First Amendment not only establishes an open marketplace of ideas, 
but also an open marketplace in civic associations. Abood allows both 
postulates to be respected: freeing nonunion members from compelled 
association with the union or compelled political contributions facilitates the 
                                                                                                                     
 122 Id. at 235–36; see also, e.g., Janus, 851 F.3d at 748 (allowing public employee to 
donate to the charity of his choice in lieu of paying fair-share service fee to union). 
 123 See Abood, 431 U.S. at 230. 
 124 Id. 
 125 See Abu El-Haj, supra note 28, at 81. 
 126 Abood, 431 U.S. at 222 (upholding constitutionality of fair-share service fees). 
 127 Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 311 (2012). 
944 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:4 
individual’s First Amendment right to choose to dissent from the project of 
unionism and to join opposing political associations; refusing to extend to 
individuals a First Amendment right to refuse to pay fees to cover 
employment-related representation ensures a structural interest in facilitating 
the sorts of civic organizations that foster informed political participation. 
Unionism may or may not be a good idea. Unions as civic associations 
may or may not be able to sustain their memberships. But if unions fail to 
sustain themselves in the marketplace of civic associations, it should not be 
the result of the Court’s reinterpretation of the freedom of speech.  
Finally, the above analysis illustrates once more how the self-governance 
interest, as theorized here, departs from prior articulations. One can accept that 
a public union’s collective bargaining speech is indirect political speech, and 
yet offer an explanation, grounded in the overarching purpose of the First 
Amendment, for why the balance, nevertheless, must be struck in the way that 
existing precedent has set. Curtailing the freedom of speech, on this account, 
is necessary to prevent the erosion of the civic associations that make 
responsive and responsible governance more possible. 
It matters not whether fair-share services fees are political speech or 
economic speech. The critical question, instead, is how much constitutional 
protection is warranted to prevent the compulsion of indirect political speech 
given the burdens a broader right will place on important existing civic 
associations. This is an entirely different type of First Amendment balancing. 
It recognizes that the interest in protecting forums for collective political 
action is rooted in the First Amendment itself and pays due respect to “the 
constitutional effort to create a democracy responsive to the people—a 
government where laws reflect the very thoughts, views, ideas, and 
sentiments, the expression of which the First Amendment protects.”128  
The significance of these trade-offs is not merely hypothetical. The two 
most salient explanations for the weakening of policy responsiveness and 
electoral accountability in political science today relate to the weakening of 
American political parties and American civic associations. Preserving and 
fostering the associational life of Americans, through political parties and 
civic associations, may well offer the most promising avenue by which to 
address the fundamental weakening of the channels of democratic 
accountability in the United States today.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The above is obviously a preliminary and provisional retheorizing of the 
self-governance interest. Its purpose is to persuade those critical of the 
trajectory of First Amendment jurisprudence under the Roberts Court that our 
scholarly efforts should be devoted to providing similarly inclined Justices on 
the Court a more coherent basis for limits to the freedom of speech and, 
                                                                                                                     
 128 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1468 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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further, that this will require accepting a properly conceptualized self-
governance interest as the theoretical foundation of First Amendment doctrine. 
The distinctive value added of the self-governance interest is that it provides 
internal First Amendment limits to the freedom of speech. It is also firmly 
grounded in the Amendment’s text, history, and purpose. The full doctrinal 
implications, of course, would need to be worked out, area by area. In many 
areas, the conclusions are likely to be that long-standing precedents make 
sense. In a number of critically contested areas, however, the approach 
outlined here suggests a need for change. For now, the critical piece is that 
this project be undertaken. 
  

